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Introduction
Opiate maintenance treatment (OMT) is increasingly being
offered in prisons throughout Europe (European Monitoring Centre
for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2012), reflecting a general
‘‘rehabilitation renaissance’’ in correctional institutions (Ward &
Maruna, 2007, p. 10). The benefits of OMT in prison have been
found to be similar to those produced by OMT in community
settings (Hedrich et al., 2012), and studies have documented that
prison-based OMT programmes reduce participants’ in-prison
drug use, risk-taking behaviour and other subcultural activities
during imprisonment (see Stallwitz & Stöver, 2007; Stöver &
Michels, 2010, p. 3 for reviews). However, prison-based OMT has
been a controversial issue because of fear of the diversion of OMT
medications and the development of black markets for prescrip-
tion drugs such as buprenorphine and methadone (Stöver &
Michels, 2010, p. 3). Studies indicate an increase in illegal
buprenorphine use in prisons in several jurisdictions (Doyle,
2013; Plugge, Yudkin, & Douglas, 2009; Tompkins, Wright,
Waterman, & Sheard, 2009). Prison-based OMT thus involves a
delicate balance between the considerations of control and
treatment. Based on a larger ethnographic study of drug rehabili-
tation in a closed Norwegian prison, this article details the way
these two considerations play out against each other in the
everyday workings of the prison’s OMT programme. The article’s
empirical point of departure is a measure that was implemented in
the prison during the study period with the intention of reducing
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A B S T R A C T
Background: Opiate maintenance treatment (OMT) is increasingly being offered in prisons throughout
Europe. The benefits of OMT in prison have been found to be similar to those produced by OMT in
community settings. However, prison-based OMT has been a controversial issue because of fear of the
diversion of OMT medications and the development of black markets for prescription drugs such as
buprenorphine and methadone. Prison-based OMT thus involves a delicate balance between the
considerations of control and treatment.
Methods: This article reports on an ethnographic study of a prison-based OMT programme in a closed
Norwegian prison. The data include field notes from eight months of participant observation in the
prison as well as qualitative interviews with 23 prisoners and 12 prison staff. Midway through the
fieldwork, the prison authorities established a separate unit for OMT-enrolled prisoners to reduce the
widespread diversion of buprenorphine. This ‘‘natural experiment’’ is explored in the analysis.
Results: The prison-based OMT programme was characterised by strict and repressive control to prevent
the diversion of buprenorphine, and the control became even stricter after the establishment of the OMT
unit. However, the diversion of buprenorphine increased rather than decreased after the establishment
of the OMT unit. To understand this ‘‘paradox of control’’, the article engages with theories of legitimacy,
power and resistance. The excessive and repressive control was perceived as illegitimate and unfair by
the majority of study participants. In various ways, many prisoners protested, confronted and subverted
the OMT programme. The increase in buprenorphine diversion is interpreted as a form of collective
resistance towards the perceived unfairness of the OMT programme.
Conclusion: The article demonstrates that an unbalanced and control-dominated approach to prison-
based OMT may have the opposite effect of what is intended.
 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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the diversion of buprenorphine through increased control and
supervision. To the author’s knowledge, this article is the first to
report ethnographic findings from a prison-based OMT pro-
gramme.
The article engages with theories of power, legitimacy and
resistance in the analysis of the ethnographic data (Bosworth &
Carrabine, 2001; Buntman, 2003; Crewe, 2009; Mathiesen, 1965;
Rubin, 2014; Scott, 1990; Sparks, Bottoms, & Hay, 1996). These
theories, although with different emphases, suggest that the
degree to which prisoners comply with institutional rules, values
and expectations is contingent upon how they experience the
power to which they are subjected and how they perceive its
legitimacy. Based on this theoretical assumption, the article
seeks to answer the following research questions: how do
participating prisoners experience the treatment and control to
which they are subjected in the OMT programme, and how do
they react towards it?
Power, legitimacy and resistance
How prisoners perceive and experience the power to which
they are subjected in prison and how they address this power has
been a main concern in the study of captive society (e.g., Crewe,
2009; Mathiesen, 1965; Sykes, 1958). While Foucault’s works (e.g.,
2008) have constituted a major influence on studies of modern
forms of penal power, an alternative research tradition has been
concerned with the issue of legitimacy (Liebling & Arnold, 2004;
Mathiesen, 1965; Sparks & Bottoms, 1995; Sparks et al., 1996;
Tankebe & Liebling, 2013; see also Tyler, 1990). Inspired by the
work of Beetham (1991), Sparks and Bottoms (1995, p. 47) argue
that ‘‘all systems of power relations’’, including those within
prisons, ‘‘seek legitimation’’. This perspective entails a critique
against those commentators who claim that prisons can be nothing
other than entirely non-legitimate. These authors agree that prison
authority may be based on force, control and coercion rather than
consent and that prisons may produce violent disorder, but, they
claim, ‘‘they do not do so equally always and everywhere’’ (Sparks
& Bottoms, 1995, p. 51). Prisons may be perceived as more or less
legitimate by the confined, and, according to these authors, the
degree to which power relations are perceived as legitimate affects
the way prisoners react and adapt to their subordinate position:
‘‘Considerations of fairness and respect are not just normatively
desirable, they are central to the achievement and reproduction of
social order itself’’ (ibid. 59). A related argument lies at the heart of
Tyler’s (1990) theory on procedural justice. Legitimacy is achieved
most effectively when criminal justice institutions act according to
principles of procedural fairness (e.g., respectful treatment, fair
and consistent decisions). When principles of procedural justice
are followed, Tyler (1990) claims, people are simply more willing
to comply with the law.
One sociological problem that has been discussed in this
literature concerns why reactions to ‘‘legitimacy deficits’’ (Bee-
tham, 1991) are individually performed in some institutions and
circumstances and collectively performed in others (e.g., Mathie-
sen, 1965; Sykes, 1958). This sociological problem is at the heart of
Mathiesen’s (1965) ethnography of the Ila detention centre in
Norway. The prisoners Mathiesen studied accused prison staff of
an arbitrary use of their wide discretionary powers, a lack of
consistency and predictability in decisions of importance to
prisoners (rewards and punishments), and a lack of adherence
to the principle of non-discrimination. However, the prisoners did
not confront this illegitimate use of power through collective and
subcultural opposition, as Sykes (1958) had described some years
earlier, but rather through an individualised defensive approach
defined as ‘‘censoriousness’’: the prisoners criticised prison staff
for not adhering to their own values and principles – or those
widely held and shared by society at large – when making
decisions (Mathiesen, 1965, p. 12). In explaining the lack of peer
solidarity and collective reactions, Mathiesen points to the
treatment-oriented regime of the prison, a regime in which power
was exercised through individual discretionary considerations,
undermining the basis for solidarity and leading prisoners to
pursue their interests individually rather than as a group. In a
recent contribution, Crewe (2009) addresses this problem in a
related way. He argues that ‘‘the institutional environment
structures the meanings of and motives for resistance’’ (2009, p.
234). The ‘‘institutional environment’’ Crewe (2009) analyses in his
comprehensive ethnographic work in an English prison is also
characterised by individualisation, albeit in a somewhat different
form. He describes how the introduction of incentive schemes,
progression in sentencing and individualised discretionary
arrangements have become the primary means of achieving
compliance with institutional rules in ‘‘the late modern prison’’. In
this context, he argues, ‘‘the kind of solidary subculture that might
engender overt, collective resistance is unlikely to be realized’’
(2007: 265). Such changes in the way power operates may explain
a more general trend in the literature on prisoners’ reactions
towards penal power: scholars increasingly investigate the small,
hidden and individually performed ‘‘everyday practices of resis-
tance’’ (e.g., Bosworth & Carrabine, 2001; Ugelvik, 2011). Inspired
by Scott (1990), studies of everyday acts of resistance point to the
agency of prisoners and the way that small or seemingly trivial
rule-violating behaviours are important for prisoners in main-
taining a sense of autonomy, identity and self-respect despite their
subordination. The motivations for engaging in such behaviour,
Bosworth and Carrabine argue (2001, p. 507), are not only ‘‘anger,
rage, exploitation and injustice’’ but also ‘‘pleasure, play and
boredom’’.
An important issue that has been addressed in this literature is
how to conceptualise the reactions to (illegitimate) power. Very
often, these reactions are described as ‘‘resistance’’. However, the
concept of resistance (particularly ‘‘everyday practices of resis-
tance’’) has been criticised for being vague, all encompassing,
romanticising and loosely defined (Buntman, 2003, pp. 250–253;
Crewe, 2009, p. 97; Rubin, 2014; see also Ortner, 1995). According
to Rubin (2014), it is problematic that the concept covers diverse
acts ranging from hunger strikes and riots initiated to bring about
political change to everyday practices of ‘‘microresistance’’ such as
disobedience, argot or quiet subversion. She argues that the label of
resistance should be reserved for ‘‘consciously political, grievance-
or justice oriented (and often collective) behaviour’’ (Rubin, 2014,
p. 5). Despite differences in approach, these scholars seem to agree
that subversive acts are best understood along a continuum, from
individually performed ‘‘everyday acts of resistance’’ on one end to
collective, organised and political actions on the other.
In the analysis that follows, I first describe how prisoners
perceived the OMT programme and then how they reacted towards
it. In the discussion, I return to the issue of legitimacy and discuss
the reactions in light of the problems outlined above.
Context
Approximately 60% of Norwegian prisoners report having used
illegal drugs the month prior to incarceration (Friestad & Hansen,
2005), and up to half of the Norwegian prison population is
considered to have a serious drug problem (Ødegård, 2008). Partly
in response to this situation, OMT is one of the drug treatment and
rehabilitation services now offered in Norwegian prisons. The
national OMT programme was introduced in Norway in 1998
(Waal, 2007). In 2004, OMT became part of the Norwegian health
care service, and participants in OMT obtained status as patients
with patient rights. The new national guidelines that were
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introduced in 2010 strongly emphasised that patients in OMT
should receive individually accommodated rehabilitation (Direc-
torate of Health, 2010). OMT patients are not charged for their
medications. Norwegian OMT has been described as ‘‘high-
threshold’’ and being rather restrictive (Waal, 2007), characterised
by a tight control regime in an effort to prevent the diversion of
medications (Havnes, Clausen, & Middelthon, 2014). Nonetheless,
the number of participants in the national OMT programme has
grown rapidly every year; as of 2013, approximately 7000 individ-
uals were enrolled, 57% of whom are prescribed buprenorphine
(Subutex/Subuxone) and 43% of whom are prescribed methadone
(Waal, Bussesund, Clausen, Håseth, & Lillevold, 2014, pp. 6, 28).
If patients in OMT are imprisoned, their treatment is continued
in prison, and opioid-dependent individuals may also enter the
national OMT programme while incarcerated. The Regional Health
Authorities are responsible for admissions to (and dismissals from)
OMT, whereas the primary health care service in each prison is
responsible for the follow-up of patients including the dispensing
of medications.
‘‘Kollen prison’’,1 a closed Norwegian prison where the
ethnographic fieldwork discussed in this article was conducted,
lies on the outskirts of a large Norwegian city (pop. <500,000) and
has a capacity of a couple hundred prisoners. The prison comprises
a handful of closed wings in separate buildings, all of which are
enclosed by a concrete wall. Each wing holds approximately
50 prisoners. In most wings, prisoners serve their time in living
units that consist of six or twelve cells and a shared living room
with a kitchen where meals are prepared.
An OMT unit was located in wing 3 of the prison and consisted
of one large living unit with approximately 10 cells and a shared
kitchen and living room. It was established midway during my
fieldwork in an effort to prevent the widespread diversion of
buprenorphine in the prison. Before the OMT unit was established,
prisoners enrolled in OMT were eligible to serve their time in all of
the prison’s wings, and they had to be escorted to the prison health
care service every morning to receive their medication. Health care
staff was responsible for dispensing the medicines, but prison
officers supervised the dispensing. During my research period, the
number of incarcerated OMT patients varied between 20 and
30. With the establishment of the OMT unit, all prisoners enrolled
in the OMT programme were placed there, and those who refused
had to serve their time in the most restrictive wing of the prison.2
The dispensing of OMT medications was also moved to the OMT
unit. By locating all OMT-enrolled prisoners in one unit and
limiting their contact with prisoners in other wings, the prison
authorities aimed to reduce the diversion of buprenorphine, save
resources by making the dispensing of medications less time
consuming, and generally improve services to the prisoners
enrolled in the OMT programme. Thus, the establishment of the
OMT unit introduced two changes to the operations of the OMT
programme that will be important in the analysis that follows.
First, the OMT-enrolled prisoners were separated from other
prisoners, and second, prison officers were delegated more
responsibility for dispensing OMT medications.
Method
The article reports findings from a larger ethnographic study of
prison-based drug rehabilitation in Kollen prison. The ethnograph-
ic fieldwork consisted of observations and open ended interviews
with prisoners and prison staff, and lasted for eight months. It was
mainly conducted in a drug rehabilitation unit in wing 2 of the
prison, but when the OMT unit in wing 3 was established the
prison authorities allowed me to pursue my research interests here
as well. I thus spent considerable time in the OMT unit during the
last three to four months of my fieldwork. The data utilised for the
analysis that follows are derived mainly from observations and
interviews conducted during these months at the OMT unit, but
interviews and observation notes covering the subject of OMT
conducted before the establishment of the OMT unit are also used.
Typically, I spent three days a week at the prison, mostly
‘‘hanging around’’ and talking informally with prisoners. I wrote
observation notes in the evening or the following day. The
observation notes covered informal conversations between prison-
ers (and between prisoners and myself) as well as descriptions of
practices I observed (e.g., dispensing practices). In addition to
observational field notes, qualitative interviews were conducted,
first with prisoners (23) and later with staff members (12). In this
article, I mainly rely on the interviews with the prisoners. The
majority of prisoners interviewed were enrolled in the OMT
programme, were in the process of applying for OMT, or used
illegal buprenorphine regularly at the time of the interview. The
interviews were open and semi-structured but shared some
common themes. Views on and experiences with the treatment
and control in OMT were covered in all interviews with the OMT-
enrolled prisoners, and the topics of drug use, drug distribution and
buprenorphine diversion in prison were addressed in all of the
interviews, irrespective of status as an OMT patient. The prisoners
interviewed were all men, typically between 25 and 45 years old,
and nearly all were ethnic Norwegians from or living in the nearby
city. Most of them were serving (or expected to serve) a sentence of
between 6 and 18 months, and most of them had considerable
experience as injecting drug users of either heroin or amphet-
amine. The interviews were fully transcribed and coded themati-
cally in NVivo 10.
Perceptions of control and power relations in OMT
The field note extract below describes the first day I was
allowed to observe the dispensing of buprenorphine in the newly
established OMT unit:
It is 10:05 in the morning, and the dispensing is about to start.
Renate, a female prison officer in her thirties, brings out the
prisoners one by one. She knocks on the cell door, the prisoner
comes to the door, shows his hands, takes both his hands up to
his mouth, inserts two fingers from each hand into his mouth,
turns cheeks and lips inside out in a rhythmic movement: first
the prisoner opens wide and stretches out his tongue, then the
cheeks are turned inside out, then the lower lip, then the upper
lip. When this procedure is repeated for all the five prisoners
present on this floor, the prisoners have to take a sip of water
from the glass provided by Renate. Then, the prisoners must
find their seats opposite the three prison officers present to
supervise the dispensing. Some of the prisoners express more
pronounced discontent than others. Hogne is the one protesting
the most: he overdramatises every movement, he groans, sighs
and shakes his head, and he repeatedly comments on the
procedure. Hogne is the prisoner who has been particularly
eager to get me to observe the dispensing, and he turns to me a
lot: ‘‘Do you see all the things they make us do? How we have to
open wide and turn our cheeks inside out?’’ When all the
prisoners are seated in front of the officers, the dispensing
starts. Vibekke, also a prison officer in her thirties, has already
prepared the medicine. While the prisoners are watching, she
carefully crushes the tablets of buprenorphine. She pours the
pieces of buprenorphine in a vial and hands it to Hogne as the
1 The proper names of the prison and the city are withheld for ethical
considerations. Similarly, all names of prisoners quoted below are pseudonyms.
2 When there were more OMT patients than cells in the OMT unit, patients on
buprenorphine had to stay in the most restrictive wing of the prison until a cell
became vacant in the OMT unit.
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first in line. He raises the vial to his mouth with large and
pronounced movements and almost throws the tablets into his
mouth. The procedure is then repeated with the four other
prisoners. Now, they have to sit in a straight line for twenty
minutes, all the while supervised by the three prison officers.
They are instructed not to raise their hands up to their mouth or
head. Most of the prisoners look down or stare emptily into
space during the next twenty minutes while Hogne does the
talking. The tablets are supposed to be dissolved after twenty
minutes, and the dispensing comes to an end. They get up one
by one, and they receive a glass of water from Renate. They have
to drink it in front of her. Then, they have to open wide for
inspection and repeat the procedure of turning their cheeks and
lips inside out before being locked up in their cells. When all the
prisoners are locked up, the prison officers pack up the
equipment. The prisoners are then locked out again, and one
by one they come out, shaking their heads, asking me for my
opinion and if by now I realised what they had meant when
telling me about the unfair dispensing procedure. (Field note,
January 2012)
According to the prisoners as well as my own observations on
several occasions, the highly controlled, supervised and ritua-
lised character of the dispensing described here was not an
exception but rather the normal and intended procedure at the
OMT unit. The clear majority of the OMT-enrolled prisoners I
came to know disapproved of the dispensing procedures. One of
the most frequent criticisms was the fact that the prisoners had
to insert their fingers into their mouth to facilitate the prison
officers’ inspection. This action was perceived as particularly
degrading:
I find it disgraceful to insert my fingers into my mouth and
things like that. However . . . what can we do? We need our
medication. (Interview, Tor)
A second frequently voiced criticism was the collective aspect of
the dispensing and the presence of prison officers. This topic came
up during an informal conversation between a small group of
prisoners (including Arne and Bjarte), me, and a prison officer:
Arne: It shouldn’t be like that. It ought to be a personal thing
between the one dispensing the medicine, which is the health
care service, and you. Like when you see the doctor or the health
care service outside [prison]. I don’t like that the prison has got
anything to do with it. And how can you address things when
you’re surrounded by prison officers and a crowd of others?
Like, in terms of adverse effects or things like that, if it is things
you would like to address. Who would like to share when you
have a group of people listening?
Bjarte: I would not. (Field note, November 2011)
The supervised and collective aspect of the dispensing was also
a core concern for prisoners before the establishment of the OMT
unit. However, the frustration increased after the establishment of
the OMT unit as prison officers were delegated increased
responsibility for dispensing medicines. The majority of the
enrolled prisoners considered it wrong that the prison officers
were so heavily involved in their medical treatment, and several
prisoners questioned the legal basis for infringements of their right
to confidentiality and privacy. Because the prison had more or less
taken over the dispensing of medicine in the OMT programme, the
frustration and criticism from prisoners were primarily directed
towards the prison and the prison officers representing it, not the
health care service.
A third frequently raised criticism concerned an unintended
consequence of locating the OMT-enrolled prisoners in a separate
unit. According to several prisoners and prison officers, this
separation had resulted in increased stigmatisation of drug users in
general and prisoners in OMT in particular (see also Havnes et al.,
2014).
During the entire fieldwork for this study, many of the enrolled
prisoners were frustrated by the level of control in the OMT
programme. This frustration increased with the establishment of
the OMT unit. The majority of the enrolled prisoners noted severe
‘‘legitimacy deficits’’ (Beetham, 1991) in the operations of the
OMT unit. They particularly emphasised the amount of control
and supervision during the dispensing of medicine, the proce-
dures used by staff when controlling and supervising the
dispensing, and the stigmatising effect of being separated from
other prisoners. Contrary to recent governmentality inspired
analysis of modern penal power (e.g. Crewe, 2009, 2011; Ugelvik,
2011), the mode of power that prisoners perceived through these
control practices could be described as more ‘‘modern’’ than ‘‘late
modern’’, more ‘‘hard’’ than ‘‘soft’’, and based more on authori-
tarian and repressive dictates than enticement and self-regula-
tion. A minority of prisoners, however, disapproved of the control
measures without questioning the overall legitimacy of the OMT
programme (see below). What type of reactions followed from
these perceptions of the legitimate and illegitimate use of
authority?
Reactions to power in OMT
Compliance
For a minority of the prisoners I interviewed and came to
know, the diversion and distribution of buprenorphine were
considered so problematic that they accepted the excessive
control regime in the OMT programme. This position was
apparent when they expressed their views on the OMT unit, as
Dag does below:
Researcher: Why did they place you at the OMT unit?
Dag: It’s because of the rules they’ve made. I don’t know. It’s to
prevent diversion of medicine. I think they exaggerate.
However, I, I do think things work out all right here, I really
do. (Interview, Dag)
Although Dag finds the level of control to be exaggerated, he
still says that things ‘‘work out all right’’. For Dag and the few other
study participants who shared his opinion, this position was
influenced by negative experiences from former prison sentences
in which fellow prisoners had bullied and threatened him to divert
his buprenorphine (see also Penfold, Turnbull, & Webster, 2005).
He experienced less pressure to divert buprenorphine in the OMT
unit simply because he socialised less with non-OMT-enrolled
prisoners. Other prisoners, who were far more critical about the
OMT programme in prison, also highlighted this as one of the few
positive effects of the establishment of the OMT unit (see also
Havnes et al., 2014).
The reaction chosen by these prisoners may be seen as a form
of normative compliance (Crewe, 2007, 2009). The prisoners
disapproved of the excessive control and complained about lack
of rehabilitation and purposeful activities in the OMT pro-
gramme, but they complied with institutional rules because
they accepted and approved of the goals that the prison sought
to accomplish (reducing the diversion of buprenorphine and
related bullying).
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Righteous critique
Many of the education, employment and rehabilitation
programmes recruited prisoners from all wings of the prison.
With few exceptions, the prisoners in the OMT unit were denied
access to these programmes to limit the possibility of
distributing diverted buprenorphine. Prisoners lamented that
their access to rehabilitative services and educational pro-
grammes was restricted because of the fear of diversion. These
restrictions were perceived as highly discriminating, and the
lack of access to meaningful activities such as work or education
was the single most important source of frustration in the
months following the establishment of the OMT unit. Thus, the
most common reaction among the study participants was to
protest against the OMT programme by public critique and
written complaints. This criticism was raised particularly with
reference to the prospect of rehabilitation, which is the primary
aim of OMT (Directorate of Health, 2010) as well as an important
principle according to Norway’s penal legislation (The execution
of sentences act, § 2):
What I find worth criticising is that people are not given a
chance to be rehabilitated in here, even if they want to. They
don’t, they don’t get the opportunity, even if they want to. [. . .] If
a young guy comes in here, in his early twenties, and he wants
to do something with his life, be a chef or whatever, well, today
it’s not possible if he’s on Subutex. And that’s the worst thing
about it. You know, you are discriminated because you get
medicine because you are in OMT. And that’s wrong; you are,
after all, a patient! (Interview, Hogne)
When the prisoners confronted staff with this critique, as Hogne
did above, they often made reference to their patient rights, their
right to rehabilitation, their right to work and education, and the
principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment. This form of
reaction could thus be described as a righteous critique. The
righteous critique resembles Mathiesen’s (1965) concept of
‘‘censoriousness’’ in that prisoners accused prison officers and
prison authorities in public for not adhering to widely held and
shared values (and rights) regarding the operation of the OMT unit.
However, whereas the censorious critique described by Mathiesen
(1965) was directed towards the arbitrariness caused by individual
treatment, the righteous critique was directed towards discrimi-
natory collective treatment.
Confrontation
A rather small group of prisoners reacted in a more
confrontational way to protest against the OMT regime. One
prisoner, highly frustrated by the lack of opportunities and the
tight control at the OMT unit, refused to take his buprenorphine
and succeeded in this way to be transferred from the OMT
unit. Another claimed to be threatened by fellow prisoners to
achieve a transfer. A more rights-oriented protest came from
Arne. He refused to insert his fingers into his mouth before and
after dispensing because he found it degrading and he was
convinced that prison staff had no right to demand it. In the field
note below, Arne instructs a fellow prisoner who is about to
begin OMT on how he should reject this procedure during
dispensing:
Arne: I simply refused because I knew they weren’t entitled to.
They’re allowed to ask you to open your mouth. And that I’ll do.
However, they want you to insert your fingers into your mouth
as well, to do a more thorough inspection, but that they are not
entitled to. So I simply refused. That pissed them off, and I was
thrown straight down [to the most restrictive wing]. (Field note,
November 2011)
Even though Arne was respected by prisoners and even some of
the prison officers for his uncompromising attitude, very few
prisoners followed his line of conduct. They simply had too many
privileges to lose, and they had too many bad experiences serving
under conditions equivalent to isolation in the most restrictive
wing of the prison.
Subversion through diversion
A substantial number of the prisoners enrolled in the OMT
programme, both before and after the establishment of the OMT
unit, reported diverting some of their medicine. The motivations
for diverting buprenorphine among participants in this study were
many and varied. The buprenorphine-enrolled prisoners in Kollen
who diverted their medication did so partly because they could
(they received a higher dosage than they felt they needed), partly
because they felt obliged to do so (to ‘‘help out’’ other prisoners),
partly out of self-interest (they received something in return), and
partly because they were bullied to do so (they feared sanctions if
they did not divert) (see also Havnes, Clausen, & Middelthon, 2013;
Penfold et al., 2005; Winstock, Lea, & Jackson, 2009; Yokell, Zaller,
Green, & Rich, 2011). However, buprenorphine diversion from
prison-based OMT should also be analysed in relation to
programme characteristics. An OMT-enrolled prisoner responded
in the following way when I probed into why he diverted and
distributed his buprenorphine:
Arne: . . ..No, it’s just the fact that it feels good to help others,
and. . ., that you can play a trick on these prison officers. To
prove to others and yourself that it’s doable.
Researcher: Yes. That’s important?
Arne: Yes, it is important. It actually is important. It may sound
bloody childish, but. . .
Researcher: No, I don’t think it sounds childish.
Arne: However, it’s, it’s just, if you can play a prank on them,
then you do it. Yes. (Interview, Arne)
He admits that his motivations to divert buprenorphine sound
childish when he articulates them during the interview, but he
insists on the importance of ‘‘playing a trick’’ on the prison officers.
Another prisoner, regarded as and respected for being the most
skilful ‘‘hustler’’ of buprenorphine in Kollen prison, said something
similar regarding his motivations to divert buprenorphine:
Researcher: However, how much of it, how much of it is
motivated by the pleasure of tricking the system in here?
Knut: Very much.
Researcher: [chuckles] Very much? Is it really?
Knut: Yes, the more you trick them, the better it is [chuckles]. It
has become quite a hobby for some of us, you know [chuckles].
[. . .] It’s kind of childish, but it’s just the way it is. (Interview,
Knut).
He laughs several times during this sequence, almost embar-
rassed, and excuses himself in the last sentence when he admits
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that the whole thing is quite childish. The language here is also
playful; for instance, he describes diversion as ‘‘tricking them’’ and
says that it has become ‘‘a hobby’’. Unquestionably, for these
prisoners, diversion of buprenorphine is an enjoyable, subversive
activity. This finding is thus in accordance with Bosworth’s and
Carrabine’s claim that counter-conduct activities ‘‘will be motivat-
ed as much by anger, rage, exploitation and injustice, as by
pleasure, play and boredom’’ (2001, p. 507, italics added). Non-OMT-
enrolled prisoners who used and distributed buprenorphine
expressed similar motivations for involvement in the contraband
activities. Independent of each other, they repeatedly used the
phrases ‘‘to fuck them’’ or ‘‘to fuck the system’’ when describing
their motives for engaging in these activities. For many, although
not all, buprenorphine diversion and its related illegal activities
were related to a defiant desire to subvert institutional rules and
expectations.
Increased control and increased subversion
The main purpose of the establishment of the OMT unit was
to put a stop to the extensive distribution of diverted buprenorphine
by increased use of various forms of control and supervision.
According to the research participants in this study, however, the
distribution of diverted buprenorphine increased rather than
decreased in the months following the establishment of the OMT
unit, and the supply to the other wings, according to prisoners,
became more organised and reliable. The following quote is from an
informal conversation with a group of prisoners in one of the
communal wings two months after the OMT unit was established:
Rune: There are many drugs in this prison right now. It’s never
been as much as now. It’s crazy. I have never seen drugs as
accessible before, and I have spent my time in prison, so to speak.
People have hid away drugs all over the place! (They laugh)
Researcher: So the establishment of the OMT unit has not been
effective?
Rune: Effective? There has never been more Subutex than is in
here right now!
Researcher: Okay? How long does it take before you have the
Subutex here? When does it come?
Rune: I would say approximately 11 a.m. [one hour after the
dispensing]. You have to be tough to stay clean now. (Field note,
February 2012)
By creatively and collectively using the few openings and
opportunities the prisoners in the OMT unit had to get out of the
unit, they managed to establish distribution lines between the
wings of the prison with the assistance of various carriers,
middlemen and hiding places. Several prisoners claimed, as Tor
does below, that these efforts had been so effective that, in some
sense, the prisoners had gained control over the dispensing of
buprenorphine in prison:
Everybody knows someone in the other wings. Based on that,
we make arrangements, we talk to each other. We know how
things are in wing 2, we know how they are in wing 5, we know
how things are in wing 4, we know how things are in wing 3. We
don’t know how things are in wing 1. We haven’t achieved
access in wing 1. It’s the only wing they control. We control the
rest. [. . .] To sum it up, you may say that the OMT unit feeds the
rest of the prison. It’s almost like that. (Interview, Tor)
Tellingly, Tor constantly refers to the collective ‘‘we’’ in the
excerpt above, as did many other prisoners in related conversa-
tions. Furthermore, these conversations showed the pride the
prisoners took in having managed to establish distribution lines of
diverted buprenorphine that, in effect, circumvented the OMT
programme. During the last three to four months of my fieldwork,
prisoners in wing 2 and 3 repeatedly (and often triumphantly)
declared the ease with which they obtained and used buprenor-
phine.
Surely, the self-confident tone in many of these statements
could be interpreted as indications of a certain ‘‘resistance
narrative’’ among these prisoners. I did however probe the issue
in great detail, particularly with the prisoners I had come to know
well and some of the prisoners who were most heavily involved in
the hustling and distribution of diverted buprenorphine. One of
these was Jacob, a prisoner who initially was suspicious of me and
the research I was conducting, but who gradually became one of
my key contacts in the prison. In one of the many informal
conversations we had in his cell, he detailed his tasks as a middle-
man, responsible for collecting diverted buprenorphine from the
OMT unit and distributing it to other prisoners in his wing:
Jacob: Things are sorted out now. Everything works out the way
it’s supposed to, it’s predictable. We have our places, you know
[lists the hiding places where the diverted buprenorphine is
stored and then picked up]. We never know for how long it will
last. But right now it works out fine. In a year or so they might
know in there [points in the direction of the guardroom]. But
hopefully I’ll be out by then.
Researcher: Alright. But how predictable is it, in terms of when
the drugs arrive and by whom?
Jacob: It’s predictable. The stuff is often still wet when we get it
[laughs]!
Researcher: [laughs] But it’s quite an accomplishment to keep
such a steady operation going?
Jacob: Yeah, but it’s also fragile. I don’t know what they know in
there [the officers]. I guess they know a little. I guess they know
more than we think they do. But I don’t think they know this
particular route, and this particular routine. But you know, it’s
enough that one guy in here talks a little bit too loudly, and then
the route is down [. . .]. But for the moment it is reliable, very
reliable. (Field note, February 2012)
Jacob’s descriptions of the practices are nuanced and detailed (I
have left out specific details on hiding places and the routine in
order not to compromise the confidentiality of research partici-
pants), and they suggest that the distribution of diverted
buprenorphine from the OMT unit had become organised,
coordinated and stable in the months following the establishment
of the OMT unit. Although some of the claims by the prisoners may
be exaggerated, a uniform judgment by the prisoners I probed the
issue with was that the distribution of buprenorphine had become
more extensive after the establishment of the OMT unit.
When the OMT unit was established, it initially became more
challenging to distribute diverted buprenorphine across the prison
estate. 3 At the same time, however, it made the diversion and
3 In the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the OMT unit I noticed a
change in the behaviour of some of the prisoners in wing 2 of the prison. They were
louder and more restless than before. I suspected first that they were high on some
different kind of drug, but it turned out that they were suffering withdrawal
because of a decline in the supply of buprenorphine. Soon after, the supply chain of
buprenorphine from the OMT unit was established and the behaviour of prisoners
and the atmosphere in the wing went back to ‘‘normal’’ again (see also Crewe, 2005:
475 on the relation between fluctuations in drug supply and social order in prison).
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distribution of buprenorphine a more symbolically rewarding
activity to pursue. The increase in buprenorphine diversion and
distribution can be seen as a reaction towards the increase in
control and supervision that was introduced with the establish-
ment of the OMT unit. This interpretation was shared by some of
the prisoners involved in the illegal activities as well as some staff
members who were critical of the level of control in OMT. For
instance, a nurse with extensive experience who held a leading
position in the prison health care service reported the following
during an interview:
It is necessary to have some control with the dispensing of
medicine. However, the correctional services are hysterical.
They are hysterical. [. . .] And I think they are way too concerned
with security. [. . .] And, and I believe that the more we prioritise
security, the more we offend the patient, and the more they feel
like tricking us. Like, they just get more creative in that
direction. (Interview, nurse, prison health care service).
Her argument echoes Scott’s (1990) assertion that acts and
practices that are perceived as offensive and that represent ‘‘slights
to human dignity’’ (1990, p. 7) provide particularly fertile soil for
the development of resistant and subversive practices. She
considered the control and supervision in the OMT programme
offensive and was not surprised to see buprenorphine diversion
flourishing in the prison.
Conclusion and discussion
The available literature reports a low prevalence of methadone
and buprenorphine diversion from prison-based OMT programmes
(Kinlock, Gordon, Schwartz, & Fitzgerald, 2010; Magura et al.,
2009) and documents that OMT reduces participants’ in-prison
drug use, risk-taking behaviour and other subcultural involvement
during confinement (see Stallwitz & Stöver, 2007; Stöver &
Michels, 2010, p. 3 for reviews). The ethnographic analysis
presented above, however, reports a different finding: diversion
of buprenorphine from the prison-based OMT programme was
extensive and contributed to a vibrant drug subculture in the
prison, in which a substantial number of prisoners were involved
in the use and distribution of prescription opioids (see also
Mjåland, 2014). Furthermore, the analysis suggested that the
diversion of buprenorphine increased during the study period
following the establishment of a separate unit for OMT-enrolled
prisoners that was intended to reduce the diversion of buprenor-
phine by means of various control measures. The data that
supports this finding is primarily based on statements from
prisoners and could be seen to reflect a ‘‘resistance narrative’’
among prisoners involved in such subversive practices. The issue
was however pursued in great detail with a substantial number of
prisoners – from two different wings of the prison – among whom
were the prisoners most heavily involved in the illegal activities. I
also spent considerable time with prison staff during the entire
period the fieldwork lasted, and I never had the impression that
they considered the establishment of the OMT unit as successful in
reducing the distribution of diverted buprenorphine. Furthermore,
if indeed the supply of buprenorphine had gone down as a result of
the establishment of the OMT unit, I most certainly would have
noticed this due to the increase in withdrawal symptoms that
would have occurred among prisoners I knew quite well by then.
These considerations of the data and the study as a whole, I argue,
lend support to the prisoners’ claims of an increase in buprenor-
phine distribution following the establishment of the OMT unit.
How can we then understand this ‘‘paradox of control’’?
Theories on legitimacy, power and resistance may provide some
answers. Sparks et al. (1996) claim that there is a strong relation
between legitimacy and social order in prisons. A related argument
is proposed by Tyler (1990), who has convincingly argued that
increased compliance with the law is most effectively achieved
when criminal justice institutions follow principles of procedural
fairness. However, the majority of the prisoners in Kollen prison
perceived the OMT programme as illegitimate and based on
procedural unfairness. Based on the prisoners’ testimonies, the
following ‘‘legitimacy deficits’’ (Beetham, 1991) are identified in
this article: (a) prison officers were not considered lawful or
competent authorities to govern the prisoners’ medical treatment;
(b) the control measures were considered degrading and
disrespectful, and the legal validity of these measures was
questioned; and (c) the prisoners’ rights to rehabilitation were
violated as a consequence of the control measures, most
prominently by the separation that was introduced with the
establishment of the OMT unit. Apart from the prisoners who
perceived the OMT programme as legitimate (because it spared
them from being bullied for their medications), a substantial
number of the study participants responded to the procedural
unfairness of the OMT programme with various forms of protest
(e.g., righteous critique), confrontation (e.g., refusal to comply) and
subversion (e.g., buprenorphine diversion). These are very differ-
ent reactions, but, I argue, they should all be seen as acts of
resistance towards the illegitimate and repressive use of power in
the OMT programme.
To substantiate this interpretation, I draw from discussions on
how to define resistance (Buntman, 2003; Crewe, 2009; Rubin,
2014). A consensus among these scholars seems to be that some
type of (political) intentionality is needed to define acts as
resistance. The righteous critique was explicitly political; prisoners
accused prison staff of discrimination, stigmatisation and poor
treatment. They raised concerns because they wanted improve-
ments to the OMT programme. The reactions I describe under the
heading of ‘‘confrontation’’ are internally very different and differ
in the degree of political intention. However, the prisoner who
refused to follow what he perceived as degrading dispensing
practices and who claimed that prison staff violated visitation rules
by demanding that he insert his fingers into his mouth to facilitate
inspection, clearly had political intentions with this behaviour. He
was, I argue, resisting power despite the consequences of having to
serve his sentence under conditions equivalent to isolation. The
subversive act of buprenorphine diversion, as the last reaction
considered here, is a complex phenomenon, and prisoners report a
range of different motivations for their actions (see Yokell et al.,
2011 for a review on diversion from community-based OMT
programs). For instance, an important explanation for the increase
in diversion after the establishment of the OMT unit was very
practical: because they were located in the same unit, it became
easier for the prisoners to advance the techniques and skills
necessary for diverting buprenorphine as well as to plan and
organise the distribution of the drug across the wings of the prison.
However, the increase in control associated with the establishment
of the OMT unit also added new political meanings to the practice
of diverting buprenorphine – political in the sense that many
prisoners came to share a common desire to undermine a measure
of which they disapproved. The prisoners who diverted their
medications did so for a number of reasons, but subversion became
increasingly important after the control measures were intensified
with the establishment of the OMT unit.
The collective nature of the diversion and further distribution of
buprenorphine requires explication. Not only are such collective
acts of subversion scarce in the recent literature, but heavy drug
users are also commonly described as a rather isolated group of
prisoners who are low in status in the prisoner community (Crewe,
2009; Ugelvik, 2011). To understand this surprising finding, we
should attend to the sociological problem outlined in the theory
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section above. Mathiesen’s (1965) main argument was that the
reactions to power that he found among prisoners – that is, a
defensive and individually performed censoriousness – served as a
functional alternative to peer solidarity. He explains the develop-
ment of censoriousness (and the lack of peer solidarity) by
highlighting the individualised and treatment-oriented character
of the institution. The individual, and thus differential, treatment
of prisoners undermined the basis for solidarity among prisoners.
Crewe (2007, 2009) highlights a similar point when he argues that
solidary subcultural resistance is unlikely to flourish in prisons
where order is sought through incentive schemes, progression in
sentencing and individualised discretionary arrangements. In the
OMT programme I studied, power relations were characterised by
the absence of such individual treatment. Prisoners were, to a large
degree, treated in the same susceptible manner, and order was
sought through degrading and collective control measures. An
unintended consequence of these procedures was that they helped
to create the kind of ‘‘cultural dissensus’’ between prisoners and
staff that is important for the development of group cohesion
around subcultural norms and activities (Mathiesen, 1965, pp.
132–134). The shared sense of being treated equally unfairly helps
to explain how the diversion of buprenorphine increasingly
became a collective practice.
Are the findings and analysis presented in this article
generalisable beyond the specific context studied? The generali-
sability of the empirical findings is difficult to assess because there
are very few other (ethnographic) studies of diversion from
prison-based OMT programmes on which to rely (but see Kinlock
et al., 2010; Magura et al., 2009). However, a recent overview
shows that OMT is increasingly being offered in European prisons
(European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction,
2012), and studies suggest that buprenorphine has become a
popular prison drug in countries such as Norway (Mjåland, 2014),
England (Tompkins et al., 2009) and Australia (Doyle, 2013). I thus
consider it likely that the empirical findings presented in this
article will have relevance beyond the specific prison studied here,
but this relevance can only be determined through future research
efforts. Furthermore, the literature on community-based OMT
programmes does, I argue, substantiate the generalisability of the
analysis presented in this article. Several studies have highlighted
how non-compliant behaviours (e.g., diversion of medications)
should be seen in relation to programme characteristics (Bour-
gois, 2000; Harris & Rhodes, 2013; Havnes et al., 2014). In
particular, procedural unfairness through degrading control and
supervision measures in community-based OMT programmes is
found to produce similar forms of subversion and resistance, as I
have shown in the analysis above (Dahl, 2007, 2008; Harris &
Rhodes, 2013). More generally, the analysis of the ‘‘paradox of
control’’ is also consistent with the argument put forward by
Foucault (2008) in Discipline and Punish, where he claims that
repressive and authoritarian forms of power can be ineffective as
they might produce resistance that undermines institutional
aims. I thus hypothesise that this article highlights important
aspects of the relation between ‘‘control and conduct’’ in prison-
based OMT that may have relevance beyond the specific prison
studied here.
Given that the analysis is relevant to other contexts, future
prison policies should discuss how to identify less harmful ways of
balancing the concerns of drug treatment, on the one hand, and
drug control, on the other (see also Stevens, Stöver, & Brentari,
2010). As a contribution to these discussions, this article
demonstrates that an unbalanced and control-dominated ap-
proach to prison-based OMT may have the opposite effect of what
is intended. The widespread diversion, distribution and use of
buprenorphine across the prison were, however, not the only
unintended consequences of the repressive features of the OMT
programme. The extensive and partly degrading control during
dispensing of medicines, the stigmatisation involved when OMT
patients were separated from other prisoners in a separate unit,
and the lack of confidentiality and intimacy in the delivery of
treatment, clearly worked against the rehabilitative aims of both
the OMT programme and Norwegian penal policy as such
(Directorate of Health, 2010; White Paper No. 37, 2007–08). The
control practices were detrimental to the development of trust and
relational intimacy between staff and prisoners, thus undermining
factors that research have shown to significantly affect the success
of rehabilitative interventions (e.g., Ward & Maruna, 2007). These
anti-therapeutic effects of the control practices may be seen to
represent a greater concern than the widespread diversion of
buprenorphine. One way to approach both issues, and here I draw
from Tyler’s (1990) arguments presented above, would be to
encourage prison mangers, prison staff and treatment providers to
plan for and execute control in ways that prisoners perceive as
humane, fair and respectful.
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Foucault, M. (2008). Overvåkning og straff. [Discipline and punish]. Oslo: Gyldendal.
Friestad, C., & Hansen, I. L. S. (2005). Mental health problems among prison inmates:
The effect of welfare deficiencies, drug use and self-efficacy. Journal of Scandinavian
Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 6, 183–196.
Harris, M., & Rhodes, T. (2013). Methadone diversion as a protective strategy: The harm
reduction potential of ‘generous constraints’. International Journal of Drug Policy, 24,
e43–e50.
Havnes, I. A., Clausen, T., & Middelthon, A. L. (2013). ‘Diversion’ of methadone or
buprenorphine: ‘Harm’ versus ‘helping’. Harm Reduction Journal, 10, 24.
Havnes, I. A., Clausen, T., & Middelthon, A. L. (2014). Execution of control among ‘non-
compliant’, imprisoned individuals in opioid maintenance treatment. International
Journal of Drug Policy, 25, 480–485.
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